Understanding Health Insurance and Policy Using Massachusetts Health Reform (2012)

Principal Investigator: Amanda Kowalski, PhD, Yale University

This project will evaluate health reform as carried out in Massachusetts with four aims: (1) estimate the welfare gain from using a mandate to reduce adverse selection; (2) model the impact of an individual mandate and subsidized health insurance on the labor market; (3) study the way in which health insurance expansions affect financial risk; and (4) model risk preferences and risk types to understand the causes of uninsurance. 

Publications

Mandate-based health reform and the labor market: Evidence from the Massachusetts reform
(May 2016, Article) 

The Individual Mandate: Theory and Practice
(August 2014, Webinar)

Did the Massachusetts Individual Mandate Mitigate Adverse Risk Selection? 
(June 2014, Issue Brief)

Adverse Selection: When Theory Meets Practice - Winner of 2016 National Institute for Healthcare Management  Research Award 
(April 2014, Article)

Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Individual Mandate: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform
(March 2014, Presentation)

Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice
(January 2014, Presentation)

The Long-Term Impact of Health Insurance Expansions
(December 2013, Presentation)

What We Have Learned from Massachusetts and Implications for National Reform
(September 2013, Presentation)

Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice
(May 2013, Presentation)